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EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AS THE NEW 
FRONTIER OF COLLECTIVISM: THE 
CASE FOR COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM 
AND POLYCENTRIC LAW 
Carlo Lottieri* 
 
Frankfurt, Bremen, Hamburg, Luebeck are large and bril-
liant, and their impact on the prosperity of Germany is 
incalculable. Yet, would they remain what they are if 
they were to lose their independence and be 
incorporated?”    – Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 1 
From the extent of our country, its diversified interests, 
different pursuits, and different habits, it is too obvious 
for argument that a single consolidated Government 
would be wholly inadequate to watch over and protect 
its interests; and every friend of our free institutions 
should be always prepared to maintain unimpaired and 
in full vigor the rights and sovereignty of the states and 
to confine the action of the General Government strictly 
to the sphere of its appropriate duties.” – Andrew 
Jackson 2 
                                                 
*Research Fellow, Philosophy of Law, Siena University, Italy. 
 An earlier version of this paper was presented in Krakow for a 
meeting of LINK, the association for IES–Europe Alumni, in November, 
2000. 
1Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Gespräche mit Eckermann, quoted in 
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “What Made Germany Great,” Rothbard–
Rockwell Report 10, no. 9 (September 1999), p. 16. 
2Andrew Jackson, A Political Testament, in Social Theories of 
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One essential of a free government is that it rests wholly 
on voluntary support. And one certain proof that a 
government is not free, is that it coerces more or less 
persons to support it, against their will. – Lysander 
Spooner 3 
 In Europe, one of the most important contemporary debates 
concerns unification and the project to create a centralized state 
with a single currency, a democratic parliament, and a monopolistic 
government. In this context, the current crisis of the European 
Monetary Unit (EMU) becomes a good argument in favor of an 
even-more-accelerated path toward the transfer of powers from 
the old nation-states to Brussels and Strasbourg. According to 
many economists and political scientists, the poor performance of 
the European single currency is the consequence of a lack of 
institutional unity. Hoping for a reversal in the declining power of 
Western socialist ideals, they call for more political centralization 
and economic planning. 
 These discussions are plagued by certain superstitions, so, in 
the first part of this article, I will try to show the irrationality of 
unifying this continent, as well as how this plan is an absurd and 
illiberal treason of the best European traditions. 
 Europeans seem to have accepted the project of a “European 
democracy” without analyzing its implications. They not only 
underestimate historical and extraordinary differences among 
European societies, they also ignore the benefits of competition 
between independent political structures and seem totally unaware 
of the distributive consequences of a massive democracy.4 They 
seem to ignore their history, particularly the medieval roots of their 
historical success, which would have been impossible if the 
European continent had ever been unified by a single political 
                                                                                                    
Jacksonian Democracy: Representative Writings of the Period, ed. 
Joseph L. Blau (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954), p. 9. 
3Lysander Spooner, No Treason, No. 2 , in The Lysander Spooner Reader 
(San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, 1992), p. 66. 
4For a strong critique of democracy from a libertarian point of view, see 
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy—The God That Failed: The 
Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order 
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2001). 
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power. 
 In the second part of my analysis, I will try to point out the 
advantages of a true federal alternative, based on institutional 
competition and communities by consent.5 Federalism, correctly 
understood, is firmly in the tradition of libertarianism. In the logic of 
radical and authentic federalism, political communities are 
“federations of individuals,” and these institutions develop new 
voluntary relationships establishing “federations of federations.” 
Thus, the term and concept of a “federal state” is a contradiction in 
terms, because a state always suggests the notion of a permanent 
chain of command incompatible with federalism and its logic of 
free agreements. In fact, federalism is a set of voluntary relations 
working within communities as well as among individuals. 
 American history offers us a tragic example  of the failure to 
comprehend the true nature of federalism: the American Civil War. 
Political theorist John C. Calhoun considered the Union to be a 
federation—the “United States” were several states joined in a 
free compact. For this reason, he defended the Southern point of 
view. However, heirs of the Hamiltonian tradition, including 
President Lincoln, were persuaded that the “United States” was a 
single state: a permanent and unified democracy. The bloody 
struggle between Northerners and Southerners from 1861 to 1865 
was the dramatic consequence of the absurd effort to link the 
conflicting notions of “state” and “federation.”6 
 Europeans have an opportunity to make good use of the 
lessons from this tragic American experience. In other words, 
Europeans must avoid the consequences of a vague definition of 
the federal compact. The main task is to build federal institutions 
                                                 
5This expression is a free borrowing from the Rothbardian idea of  
“nations by consent”; see Murray N. Rothbard, “Nations by Consent: 
Decomposing the Nation-State,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 11, no. 1 
(Fall 1994), pp. 1–10. 
6For an interesting analysis of the peculiarity of the Jeffersonian tradition 
with reference to differences between European and American ideas of 
sovereignty, see Luigi M. Bassani, “Jefferson, Calhoun, and States’ 
Rights: The Uneasy Europeanization of American Politics,” Telos 114 
(Winter 1999), pp. 132–54. 
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and, for this reason, to coordinate a strong resistance against rising 
centralism.7 
 To pursue this objective, European peoples must elaborate a 
new vision of Europe—a vision based on property rights, individual 
liberty, the free market, local autonomies, federalism, and the right 
of secession. This is the glorious past of the Old Continent, and this 
can be—while the age that saw the triumph of the modern state 
and totalitarian ideologies seems to be fading—its future. 
 
FOUR SUPERSTITIONS ENTERTAINED BY THE 
DREAMERS OF A CENTRALIZED SUPERSTATE 
Superstition # 1: Individual liberty and juridical polycentrism 
cause tensions and, ultimately, wars. 
 For the last few centuries, European countries have engaged in 
many wars, with imperialism and statist ideologies as their chief 
causes. Nevertheless, these tragedies are often explained with 
recourse to the notorious Hobbesian argument. For many 
contemporary intellectuals and politicians, European peoples were 
enemies in the past because they were separated by the frontiers 
of independent states. Consequently, they can achieve a peaceful 
future only if they build common political institutions. In this 
philosophy, European unification is only one step in the long path 
toward the political unification of the whole world. 
 In the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes, frightened by 
religious divisions, conceived Leviathan as the only possible 
apparatus capable of imposing peace. Individuals lost their 
freedoms through the social contract, and received peace and life 
in return.8 The state affirmed itself as the condition for the 
                                                 
7An interesting analysis of the transition from the Articles of 
Confederation (1781–1789) to the federal Constitution is  in Peter A. 
Aranson, “The European Economic Community: Lessons from America,” 
Journal des Économistes et des Études Humaines 1, no. 4 (December 
1990), pp. 473–96. 
8Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). Some modern classical liberals accept Hobbesian 
utilitarian analysis of the necessity to move from the state of nature to an 
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avoidance of chaos, wars, and anarchy. Its first justification was 
the individual’s fear of being killed by a fellow man. This 
interpretation remains well accepted, with the implicit idea that the 
state can be a “neutral” power, having no ideology of its own, and, 
thus, can be competent to nullify any religious, social, or ideological 
conflict. 
 However, these arguments are not consistent with the facts. 
The religion wars faded away only when a new sort of religion 
(statist ideology) imposed its power over civil society and 
traditional faiths. At the beginning of modern history, secular power 
became “sovereign,” losing its moral bounds after such onslaughts 
as Marsilio von Padua’s Defensor Pacis and Machiavelli’s Il 
Principe.9 But the success of this kind of “peace” marks the 
beginning of a more important statist aggression to free 
confessions. It was also the precondition for implementing 
contemporary totalitarian regimes.10 
 The Hobbesian notion that a spontaneous order (such as a 
free market of rules, laws, and institutions) is a theoretical 
impossibility must be recognized as the most important cultural 
factor. It is this idea that now pushes continental leaders toward 
the increase of political cohesion and the reduction of economic 
competition. Yet, there are many arguments against this view, both 
theoretical and empirical. Concrete experiences demonstrate that 
men can, and do, create cooperation and harmony in the absence 
                                                                                                    
organized and monopolist government. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, The 
Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1975); and Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private 
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985). 
9Marsilio von Padua, Defensor Pacis (Leipzig: Dyk, 1913); and Niccolò 
Machiavelli, Il Principe (Paris: chez Charles Estienne Imprimeur du Roy, 
1553). 
10In the twentieth century, the persecution of Christians, Jews, Muslims, 
and Buddhists in every communist and totalitarian regime (as well as in 
the secular propaganda of many Western democratic societies) has 
shown the real “religious” nature of the Machiavellian-Hobbesian 
solution. 
Journal of Libertarian Studies 
6 
of a legal monopoly.11 
 Besides that, the creation of a European democratic power 
would reduce competition. For example, if the Italian government 
might now cut taxes because it fears that capital and firms might 
want to leave the country (e.g., in order to exploit new 
opportunities in Germany, France, or the United Kingdom), in a 
European unified state, even this remote possibility will disappear. 
In fact, “harmonization” is the catchword most utilized by the 
militant unificationists. 
 The global economy is a space of peace and exchanges, 
because, in the market, the relationships in which every actor 
participates are voluntary. Increasing political unification, however, 
is a sure way to generate more conflicts, since different peoples in 
different industries in different regions have different institutions, 
methods, and techniques. Political unification imposes a “one size 
fits all” solution on every issue, while, in a world of competition, 
different solutions will arise in different places. 
 It is also important to remember that, in Britain or Spain, the 
persistence of centralist policies (despite the opposition of Irish and 
Basque secessionists) is a relevant factor in radical conflicts. The 
present European situation teaches us that it is impossible to unify 
peoples in a coercive way and, at the same time, pretend to 
peaceful relationships. A compulsory Union would be the premise 
for all sorts of tensions. 
 In addition, the process of European democratization might also 
signify a more important presence of European armies around the 
world. The consequence would be a new form of imperialism, and, 
thus, it would copy the worst things of recent American history. 
 
Superstition # 2: The market requires the state: it is the 
result of the juridical order created by the political 
monopoly. 
 James M. Buchanan is one of the scholars who have most 
                                                 
11See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: 
Basic Books, 1984). 
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insistently emphasized the necessity to unify Europe. His idea is 
that classical liberals and libertarians must encourage every effort 
“to move toward federalist structures in which political authority is 
divided between levels of government.” In Buchanan’s theory of 
federalism, a free-market society needs competition between 
separate state or provincial units. He remarks that localized 
politicians and coalitions are less able  “to depart significantly from 
overall efficiency standards in their taxing, spending, and regulatory 
politics.”12 But he adds that the exit option must be guaranteed by 
the central government, an option which effectively limits the ability 
of state or provincial governments to exploit citizens. 
 As a consequence of this analysis, Buchanan says, in the U.S., 
“effective reform must embody devolution of power from the 
central government to the states,” while in Europe, “reform 
requires the establishment of a strong but limited central authority, 
empowered to enforce the openness of the economy, along with 
the other minimal state functions.”13 Buchanan’s underlying thesis 
is that individual liberty cannot be protected by a simple competition 
of governments; for this reason, European peoples must accept a 
monopolistic continental power. 
 The logic is clear, and Buchanan clarifies his position when he 
states that accepting the idea “that private and voluntary action can 
be efficacious over the whole social space (including basic 
protections to person, property, and contract)” would represent “a 
leap backward into the Hobbesian jungle.”14 However, this analysis 
is weak, because the equation between liberty and chaos is not 
justified.15 
                                                 
12James M. Buchanan, “Federalism and Individual Sovereignty,” Cato 
Journal 15, nos. 2–3 (Fall/Winter 1996), pp. 259 and 261. For a more 
complete introduction to the themes of public-choice competitive 
federalism, see George Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Power to 
Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
13Buchanan, “Federalism and Individual Sovereignty,” p. 266. 
14Buchanan, “Federalism and Individual Sovereignty,” p. 267. 
15In fact, Buchanan accepts the Hobbesian idea of freedom as “license,” 
while classical liberal and libertarian traditions are closer to the Lockean 
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 One does not have to share libertarian ethical principles to 
observe that a juridical order emerges even in societies lacking a 
monopolistic group of rulers. Roman Law, Lex Mercatoria , and 
Common Law are important examples of rules emerging in a social 
order rather than in a state order. For centuries, and in many 
different contexts, people lived together in well-defined juridical 
systems without a common policy fixed by a king or a parliament.16 
As Bruno Leoni pointed out in Freedom and the Law, for instance, 
the Romans accepted and applied a concept of certainty 
of the law that could be described as meaning that the 
law was never to be subjected to sudden and 
unpredictable changes. Moreover, the law was never to 
be submitted, as a rule, to the arbitrary will or to the 
arbitrary power of any legislative assembly or of any 
person, including senators or prominent magistrates of 
the state.17 
 One of the most important lessons of libertarian realism is the 
idea that the state is not the protector of our rights and liberties, but, 
rather, their worst enemy. Its existence is a continuous aggression 
against our liberty, property, and autonomy. Accordingly, in 
Western societies, free-market relations exist despite the state, 
rather than because of it. 
 Classical liberals and libertarians must become more aware 
                                                                                                    
definition of state of nature: “though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not 
a state of licence.” John Locke, Two Treatises of Government . . . The 
Latter is an Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of 
Civil Government (London: Everyman, 1996), § 4, p. 117. 
16When Bruce Benson presents the Law Merchant, he stresses that “the 
reciprocity necessary for the recognition of commercial law arose due to 
the mutual gains generated by exchange.” See Bruce Benson, The 
Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State (San Francisco: Pacific 
Research Institute for Public Policy, 1990), p. 31. In a similar way, Leoni 
built his legal theory on the hypothesis that rules are the result of an 
exchange of claims. The “claim” is the individual act that originates law, as 
demand and offer are the choices that create prices. See Bruno Leoni, 
“The Law as Individual Claim,” Archiv für Rechts–und Sozialphilosophie 
(1964), pp. 45–58. 
17Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law (New York: Van Nostrand, 1961), pp. 
84–85. 
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that the roots of our history of freedom lie in the institutional 
pluralism of the Middle Ages. As Boudewijn Bouckaert wrote, 
polycentric extended orders, such as Medieval Peace of 
God (1100–1500), do not conform with the Hobbesian 
intuition about power and order. . . . The Medieval order 
was an order without a sovereign power in the 
“modern” sense of the word, i.e., a central power 
disposing of a monopoly of a coercive power enabling it 
to rule a whole nation and to act as a conflict-solver of 
the last resort.18 
Robert Nisbet makes a similar observation: 
Medieval society, from the point of view of formal 
authority, was one of the most loosely organized 
societies in history. Despite the occasional pretensions 
of centralizing popes, emperors, and kings, the authority 
that stretched theoretically from each of them was 
constantly hampered by the existence of jealously 
guarded “liberties” of town, gild, monastery, and 
village.19 
And Leonard Liggio remarks that, after 1000 A.D., 
while bound by the chains of the Peace and Truce of 
God from looting the people, the uncountable manors 
and baronies meant uncounted competing jurisdictions 
in close proximity. . . . This polycentric system created a 
check on politicians; the artisan or merchant could 
move down the road to another jurisdiction if taxes or 
regulation were imposed.20 
 At the origin of this complexity is the failure of the Imperial 
                                                 
18Boudewijn Bouckaert, “L’aria delle città rende liberi: Le città medievali 
come comunità volontarie,” Biblioteca della libertà 29 (1994), p. 10, n. 127. 
An English version of this article, without the passage quoted above, is 
“Between the Market and the State: The World of Medieval Cities,” in 
Values and the Social Order, ed. Gerard Radnitzky (Aldershot: Avebury, 
1997), vol. 3, pp. 213–41.  
19Robert Nisbet, The Quest for Community (San Francisco: Institute for 
Contemporary Studies, 1990) p. 99. 
20Leonard Liggio, “The Medieval Law Merchant: Economic Growth 
Challenged by the Public Choice State,” Journal des Économistes et des 
Études Humaines 9, no. 1 (March 1999), p. 65. 
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design to realize a political unification of the Christian world. 
European capitalism grew in part because of the weakness of 
political power. In the second part of the Middle Ages, the 
Emperor was not in condition to subjugate the Catholic Church, 
merchants, artisans, bankers, and the countless small armies. As a 
consequence, the last centuries of the Middle  Ages were marked 
by the success of a pluralist order characterized—as it had been 
since the ninth century A.D.—by many allodial properties, free 
from regal control and from every form of political (eminent) 
domain.21 In his Edictum Pistense (864 D.C.), Emperor Charles 
“The Bold” censured all those who “built castles and fortresses 
without any permission and in an illegal way” (castella et 
firmitates et haias sine nostro verbo fecerunt). But the 
weakness of Imperial power encouraged the diffusion of self-
protection and this “form of possession free from any obligation.”22 
 Defenders of a libertarian European heritage must 
acknowledge their history of property rights, pluralism, and 
competition. They also have to rediscover a rational way to solve 
conflicts and manage quarrels without resorting to a compulsory 
state logic or to a central coercive power. 
 
Superstition # 3: The existence of a European identity calls 
for the construction of a single state in Europe. 
 As there are important differences among England and 
Greece, Spain and Germany, or France and Poland, there are 
different ways to be European. While Europeans have in common 
many characteristics which distinguish them from, say, Africans or 
Asians, this fact doesn’t imply the necessity of a single European 
state. 
                                                 
21This situation lasted sometimes until the fifteenth century. As Peter 
Partner remarks about the Papal State, a large number of lords commonly 
described as barons “were, in reality, allodial landowners, whose tenure 
was in no way feudal.” See Peter Partner, “The Papal State: 1417–1600,” in 
Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the State in Early Modern 
Europe, ed. M. Greengrass (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), pp. 34–35. 
22Giovanni Tabacco, “L’allodialità del potere nel Medioevo,” Studi 
Medievali 11, no. 2 (1970), p. 571. 
Lottieri – European Unification as the New Frontier of Collectivism 
11 
 On the contrary, as indicated earlier, one of the most important 
elements of this European identity is history, and history has not 
always been the nation-state’s dominion. In fact, pluralism has 
been the key of European historical success, and such pluralism 
meant the absence (at the end of the Middle Ages) of a powerful 
center of political decisions. Europe had Church, Empire, a number 
of kings and princes, a multitude of feudal relationships, and, in 
some regions, independent cities, but it never had a small group of 
rulers able to organize economic life and civil society. Jean 
Baechler, in his important study about the origins of capitalism and 
the role of medieval anarchy, noted that “the dark centuries have 
undeniably diffused a spiritual order, but also a deep disorder in 
politics and the economy.”23 This manageable chaos explains our 
success. 
 Nevertheless, the nation-state has been a compromise between 
the will to realize a universal political control and the resistance of 
the society (religion, economy, culture). The failure of the Imperial 
project at the end of the Investiture Contest was exploited by 
Norman theorists (Hugh of Fleury, for instance) who re-elaborated 
old concepts in relation to new “national” powers (regna).24 In 
Europe, the contrast opposing Church and secular institutions is a 
constant of the period prior to the full success of the state. 
                                                 
23Jean Baechler, Les origines du capitalisme  (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1971), p. 111. On p. 126, Baechler wrote that “the expansion of 
capitalism has its origins and its rationale in the political anarchy” of 
medieval times. 
 See also Robert S. Lopez, The Commercial Revolution of the Middle 
Ages, 950–1350 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); E.L. 
Jones, The European Economic Miracle (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981); Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The 
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1983); David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of 
Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (New York: Norton, 
1999); and Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (New York: Knopf, 
1999). 
24Hugh of Fleury (Hugonis monaci Floriacensis), Tractatus de regia 
potestate et sacerdotali dignitate, vol. 2, Monumenta Germaniae 
Historica, Libelli de lite, ed. E. Sackur (Hanover: Hahn, 1892), pp. 466–94. 
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 In France, Spain, or England, power began a long journey 
toward absolutism, but the presence of multiple state organizations 
was always an opportunity for the freedom of individuals, even as it 
reduced the capacity of the ruling classes to exploit and dominate 
civil society. This is another reason why the will to unify Europe 
shows a serious misunderstanding of what European identity is, and 
prepares for a subversion of its deepest heritage. 
 
Superstition # 4: There will be harmony in a unified Europe, 
and political institutions will be able to support the 
development of poor societies (Eastern Europe, for 
instance). 
 This idea of “forced” solidarity is not compatible with 
libertarian principles, or with the notion that people must be 
respected in their dignity and liberty. The public redistribution of 
resources implies a strong centralized power capable of controlling 
society. 
 Recent Italian experience also teaches us that coercive 
solidarity creates hostility where there had been harmony and 
respect. For centuries, Northern and Southern Italy enjoyed 
relatively good relations; traditional political divisions didn’t hinder 
cultural and economic exchanges, and there was no intolerance. 
Current social and cultural tensions between these regions result 
from a unified policy, a consequence of the 1861 birth of the Italian 
Kingdom. At the end of the nineteenth century, protectionist 
governments aided Northern industries and damaged Southern 
agricultural exports. The situation changed in the twentieth century, 
when the creation of an important welfare state was the cause of 
massive redistribution from the rich North to the poor South. In 
addition, the various Italian peoples were forced to live together 
and abide by the same rules. 
 The first consequence of these political decisions is that there 
is now a considerable and widespread hatred between Northern 
and Southern Italy. While the free market has a tendency to bring 
people together, coercive politics tend to divide them. 
 Moreover, the Italian experience of political unification shows 
that statist solidarity has not been a tonic for poor economies. In 
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the last fifty years, Northern firms and families have spent a great 
deal of money financing programs for the South. However, the 
occasional encouraging changes or trends come only from local 
and spontaneous initiatives. 
 Welfare programs redistributed money to large firms and the 
mafia, multiplied public employees, strengthened trade-union 
organizations, and reduced incentives for work. Eastern Europeans 
in particular must keep this Italian lesson in mind, because they 
have to refuse a model of development based on political 
investments and bureaucratic regulation. The main source of 
economic and social growth is to be found in property rights, and it 
is quite evident that the logic of coercive solidarity is the explicit 
negation of this legal order. 
 Hernando de Soto’s most recent book offers us a useful 
confirmation of libertarian theses. In the analysis developed in The 
Mystery of Capital, poverty is seen not only as a consequence of 
the lack of private property rights, but also as the fatal result of a 
social order incapable of producing trust or of transforming 
concrete assets into immaterial and “abstract” capital (necessary 
to finance new ideas and realize capitalist growth). As de Soto 
points out, Third World and former communist peoples “have 
forgotten (or perhaps never realized) that converting a physical 
asset to generate capital—using your house to borrow money to 
finance an enterprise, for example—requires a very complex 
process.” The creation of capital requires a conversion process, 
because “capital is first an abstract concept and must be given in a 
fixed, tangible form to be useful.”25 
 This difficult evolution toward capitalism cannot be the 
outcome of a political economy based on state aid and regulation. 
Only the other path  (free-market economy, competition, and 
individual responsibility) can present conditions to offer a future to 
Eastern Europe and to all countries in search of justice, wealth, and 
civilization.26 
                                                 
25Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs 
in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 
40, 42–43. 
26See Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the 
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WHAT CAN WE DO? FOUR IDEAS FOR THE FUTURE 
 
Refusing European Political Unification, Defending  
Free Trade and Globalization 
 Because the creation of this cartel of monopolist rulers would 
reduce institutional competition and individual freedom, we must 
oppose the project of European political unification. In a large and 
politically unified country, the welfare state will find no hurdles, so 
redistributive policies will become the rule. Every government 
expenditure affects a large number of people, but the single 
individual usually pays only a fraction, and, thus, prefers not to 
bother with organizing a resistance. The consequence is an 
increase in taxation and the satisfaction of many lobbies. 
 Some economists believe that European unification would bring 
about the abolition of all internal barriers to free trade. However, 
this idea is not true. For instance, a directive adopted in 1973 
allowed the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark to make 
chocolate containing up to 5% vegetable fats, but not to sell it as 
chocolate in other member states. As a result, the Italian, Belgian, 
and French governments obtained a prohibition of chocolate 
imports from other member states. Through health and safety 
regulation, there are now similar directives against Spanish 
strawberries, French camembert, and so on.27 
 In addition, the political leaders of a unified Europe might try to 
build a protectionist Europe, an unassailable fortress against Asian 
and American competitors. To pursue this kind of policy would be 
impossible in a small nation (incapable of self-sufficiency), but a 
large area, such as Europe, can help to foster the illusion that 
protectionism will help the economy, protect wages, and bring 
about full employment. As Hans-Hermann Hoppe emphasizes, “a 
country the size of the U.S., for instance, might attain 
                                                                                                    
Third World (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), in which he discussed 
economies of developing nations. 
27Fred Aftalion, “Regulatory Competition, Extraterritorial Powers and 
Harmonization: The Case of the European Union,” Journal des 
Économistes et des Études Humaines 9, no. 1 (March 1999), pp. 98–99. 
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comparatively high standards of living even if it renounced all 
foreign trade, provided it possessed an unrestricted internal capital 
and consumer goods market.” 
 On the contrary, in small jurisdictions, this error is less frequent, 
because “the smaller the country, the greater the pressure to opt 
for free trade rather than protectionism.”28 Swiss Cantons, 
Liechtenstein, San Marino, Andorra, or Monaco never dreamed of 
obtaining advantages by refusing international trade. These small 
political communities—the true and only heirs of the great 
European spirit—are interested in the diffusion of libertarian and 
free-market principles. They want to export their specialties and 
buy all the goods they can’t (or won’t) produce. In fact, these small 
political entities are in the best position to teach an important lesson: 
the international division of labor is useful for individuals, families, 
communities, and companies. 
 For this reason, it is urgent to reject the political project of a 
unified Europe, and to adopt an alternative model—a more flexible 
one based on pacts and contracts. 
 If “Europe” exists—and a European identity is clearly in our 
past and our present—it can exploit the opportunity of economic 
integration (globalization) and free movement of information. In the 
international circulation of money, goods, and ideas, we don’t see a 
central planner: order emerges spontaneously as a result of 
voluntary cooperation. 
 In a free society, it can be easy to satisfy our need to 
rediscover our common historical heritage and develop institutional 
and economic links. In a Europe based on property rights, the wall 
that still divides West and East could quickly disappear and, free 
from the rigid constructivism of their politicians, European peoples 
could organize new and truly federal relationships. 
 
Free European Relationships in a Polycentric World 
 For centuries, within the structure of the nation-state, the idea 
of sovereignty guaranteed that the King and, then, Parliament were 
                                                 
28See Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Small is Beautiful and Efficient: The Case 
for Secession,” Telos 107 (Spring 1996), p. 100. 
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able to control society. But this hierarchical construction was also 
the premise of an anarchical international order. The Kantian idea 
of a world federation, the distant progenitor of contemporary 
European unification, must be explained as the logical consequence 
of an international regime based on sovereign entities.29 
 The paradox of the nation-state is in its promise of law and 
order only within its borders: internal hierarchy and external 
autonomy (the so-called international anarchy). But if modern 
political culture preferred hierarchy to anarchy (and it adopted the 
Hobbesian framework), the result was that our international 
(dis)order had to be modified. If the state had the task of avoiding 
violence inside its borders, Kant imagined a parallel solution to the 
problem of law and order in the international arena. In other words, 
the pursuit of peace and harmony among different peoples could 
happen only through a “higher” (both ethically and geographically) 
political center able to reduce conflicts to a minimum. 
 The Kantian dream of “eternal peace” is the politically correct 
version of the projects of Napoleon and Hitler, the political leaders 
more seriously engaged in the construction of a European state. 
Present-day prophets of a united world share with these statesmen 
a strong preference for a society directed, more or less violently, by 
a small political elite. Furthermore, they have in common a similar 
distrust about human liberty. 
 One must also understand that European unification is only one 
step toward global unification, and that the determination to abolish 
political polycentrism is the most important threat to freedom. As 
already noted, Europe’s finest hour was characterized by a system 
of hundreds of semiautonomous entities with a free and open 
market.30 
                                                 
29Immanuel Kant, Plan for a Universal and Everlasting Peace (New York: 
Garland, 1973). 
30German history, in this sense, is interesting. Before the Napoleonic wars, 
Germany consisted of hundreds of independent political units. There were 
important regional states such as Prussia or Bavaria, but also a multitude 
of free cities, knightly manors, and other small territorial entities. Besides 
any other consideration, in that institutional context, the rise of a Hitler 
was an evident impossibility. 
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 At the same time, opposing continental unification means 
rejecting the neo-protectionism of those media heroes, the “Seattle 
people.” For this reason, European peoples must defend their 
traditional values: openness, competitiveness, respect for their 
fellow men and their rights, localism, and free spontaneous 
commonality. But they must also be honest and acknowledge the 
fact that many important European values migrated to North 
America in ships carrying European colonists and religious 
dissenters to the Atlantic coast. Our hope is that these traditional 
values have not left the continent forever. 
 
Federal Europe, Free Communities, and  
the Right of Secession 
 Against the pseudo-federalism of Maastricht, classical liberals 
and libertarians must speak up on behalf of the true federal 
tradition. In the West, we have a great deal of historical 
experience: Jewish tribes, Greek poleis, ancient German 
communities, Italian and Flemish medieval Communes, the 
Hanseatic League, the Dutch United Provinces, the Swiss 
Confederation, and the early republic in Jeffersonian America. We 
also have classical liberal and libertarian thinkers who paid attention 
to this topic, from Althusius to Jefferson, from Calhoun to Lord 
Acton, and from Spooner to Nock. 
 There is also a small group of social theorists working on a 
correct vision of federal theory. For instance, some ideas of Bruno 
S. Frey can be useful in showing a possible evolution toward an 
increasingly free and competitive society. The project of FOCJ 
(functional, overlapping, and competitive jurisdictions) and the idea 
of a solid utilization of the “right of secession” (with the purpose of 
creating nations by consent and a true market for institutions, 
where individuals can shop for the best political arrangements) are 
the prerequisites for constructing federal relationships among 
individuals and groups.31 Despite his unjustified insistence about the 
role of direct democracy (and the inconsistent defense of the 
                                                 
31Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, “Competition Among 
Jurisdictions: The idea of FOCJ,” in Competition among Institutions, ed. 
L. Gerken (London: Macmillan, 1995). 
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welfare-distributive logic), the institutional framework Frey 
imagined would be a good step toward a European federation. 
 But a federal Europe is exactly the opposite of a unified 
Europe. When I emphasize the need to develop negotiated 
connections among small political communities, I want to stress the 
difference between the existing Europe and the voluntary political 
order that European libertarians favor. In a federal institution, 
Roland Vaubel wrote, “each member state would have the explicit 
right to leave the union at any time, if a simple majority of its 
population voted in favor of secession.”32 The possibility for any 
community to dissolve the federal compact (the right of exit) is the 
only condition that can force the central power to respect the rights 
of the federation’s members (states, regions, cities, and 
individuals). 
 For this reason, it is important to support every political 
“devolution” of powers from the center to the separate local 
entities: from London to Scotland, from Rome to Lombardy, from 
Madrid to Catalunia. In the project of realizing a true federalist 
Europe, it is decisive that regions and cities can opt to secede, and 
that they can discuss their bond with the nation-state and the 
European Union. 
 In this sense, we must also defend the idea that federalism can 
be a strategy to imagine and achieve political relationships without 
the state (or beyond and after the state). In fact, federal pacts 
imply mutual agreements and horizontal contracts. Federalism, the 
theory of political pacts, demands a new elaboration of the notion 
of political community. In a true federal society, the right to 
abandon the union must be preserved; after all, this is the most 
important guarantee that the federal authority will respect different 
realities. 
 If European politicians and bureaucrats are, in fact, impatient to 
                                                 
32Roland Vaubel, “The Political Economy of Centralization and the 
European Community,” Journal des Économistes et des Études Humaines 
3, no. 1 (March 1992), p. 41. From a libertarian point of view, it is not easy 
to understand why, in Vaubel’s statement, the right of secession is given 
only to states, and not to regions, cities, or individuals. The reference to 
the coercive decisions of majority groups is also ethically unacceptable. 
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destroy our right to abandon the secular Paradise they are planning 
for us, the reason is that they want to be free to make it as close to 
Hell as possible. The Euro nightmare under construction will be a 
land with Italian bureaucracy, French regulation, Scandinavian 
taxation, German trade unions, and no right to opt out. 
 
Human Dignity and the Spirit of Europe 
 Against socialist solidarity (whether nationalist or 
internationalist), classical liberals and libertarians must protect the 
dignity of human beings and their right not to become objects of 
political and coercive decisions. We have to defend our experience 
of true solidarity: in families, associations, churches, and so on. We 
must understand that state charity is a pretext of political rulers 
eager to increase their power at the expense of the people. 
Furthermore, we must explain that the political machine operates a 
redistribution that never helps the poor. In general, redistribution for 
benefits the strongest lobbies. It helps the rich, intelligent, and 
sophisticated citizen; in brief, it helps only those who know how the 
system really works. 
 Even in this case, a comparison between Europe and America 
can be useful. In the United States, because the government is less 
invasive and property rights are more protected, there is an 
important net of private mutual aid associations. Our ability to attain 
a sense of community and true solidarity rests directly on our 
freedom. 
 Against the new socialism of Philippe van Parijs (who proposes 
that everyone—including California surfers—be paid a universal 
basic income at a subsistence level),33 and against Habermas’s 
idea of universal democratic integration,34 it is important that we 
preserve the individual’s right to reject political obligation. Honest 
men don’t respect unjust laws. 
                                                 
33Philippe Van Parijs, “Why Surfers Should be Fed: The Liberal Case for 
an Unconditional Basic Income,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 20, no. 2 
(Spring 1991), pp. 101–31. 
34See Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political 
Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998). 
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 But, in the new millennium, only a radical change in our vision 
of society can bring about a rebirth of European liberties. As 
Étienne de la Boétie pointed out,35 the power of the political elite 
can be explained only by the fact that people voluntarily obey 
laws (he called it the mystery of civil obedience). Consequently, 
when we cease to obey, unjust power will disappear, and we will 
have the opportunity to build a more civilized way to live together. 
 In the great miracle of medieval Europe, the Catholic Church 
played an important role. It was, undoubtedly, the main hindrance 
that Empire found in its attempt to build an absolute power. The 
moral and cultural force (and also its economic and military 
importance) of the primary religious agency of the Middle Ages 
was influential in preventing the complete triumph of the imperial 
design. The strong relationship between the German Emperor and 
the Franciscans—both averse to the wealth of the clergy and the 
political power of the Pope—and the struggle of Philip “The 
Beautiful” against the Templars are two different confirmations of 
the fact that the presence of a rich and influential Church was, for 
a long time, a restraint to any political ambition to subjugate the 
society. 
 While much in the contemporary context is radically changed 
from medieval Europe, religious communities can remain an 
obstacle for the ruling class. For this reason, every tradition, ethnic 
group, culture, and language (when they become the occasion for a 
conscious action of resistance in the face of state power and its 
will to standardize society) must be appreciated as instruments for 
the defense of everybody’s freedom. 
 The actual situation seems more complex, but, despite the 
philosophical and religious differences separating European 
individuals, there is a common heritage strictly related to the 
Christian roots of the continent: at the center of this culture, there is 
the idea of the infinite value of every individual. When Murray N. 
Rothbard developed his social ethics on the non-aggression axiom, 
he rediscovered an important element of European society, and 
                                                 
35Étienne de la Boétie, Discours de la servitude volontaire (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1983). 
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suggested a hypothesis for how to overcome the present situation. 
 During the modern age, Europeans have considered the 
existence of a two-class order, with rulers and subjects, as natural. 
Only a small group of libertarian thinkers have expressed their 
dissatisfaction with this situation, and have engaged in a cultural 
campaign for liberating the new slaves of monarchical and 
democratic regimes. But the current unqualified acceptance of 
despotism is also the consequence of a lack of ethical 
responsibility. This European crisis, generated by the widespread 
acceptance of aggression and the refusal to resort to self-defense, 
has moral origins. 
 Therefore, a complete change in the way we connect with 
other people implies a rediscovery of human dignity and a more 
vivid sense of altruistic responsibility toward our fellow men, as 
well as ourselves. If Europeans will be generous and at the same 
time more respectful of individual natural rights, the claims of public 
authorities to justify their role as social benefactors will appear to 
everyone as a tragic farce. And we will all see that the Emperor—
even the European Emperor—has no clothes. 
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